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Abstract
Peace in Northern Ireland today remains fragile despite the exhaustive peacebuilding efforts
that have taken place since the Good Friday Agreement in 1998. Many aspects of the sectarian
conflict have been embedded in cultural substrata of the respective communities, and cultural
transformation is necessary to achieve comprehensive and sustained peace. The basic
assumptions about the Other in this sectarian conflict have their origin in traumatic events that
occurred more than three hundred years ago and have been reinforced by the more recent three
decades of conflict known as the Troubles. These traumatic individual and collective
experiences across the generations have had a profound effect on the culture and peace
processes within Northern Ireland. Two articles, Parts 1 and 2, on cultural work in
peacebuilding among traumatized communities of Northern Ireland describe a
psychodynamically informed understanding of the sectarian conflict and an approach to
cultural transformation called “cultural work.” This first article discusses general contextual
issues and includes a history of Northern Ireland from a psychodynamic perspective and
presents a framework for considering culture and a process of transformation.

Eugen Koh is a Senior Fellow, psychiatrist, and psychoanalytic psychotherapist, and a consultant in art, culture,
trauma, and peacebuilding at the Melbourne School of Population and Global Health, University of Melbourne.
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The Good Friday or Belfast Agreement in 1998 marked the beginning of the end of three
decades of violent sectarian conflict in Northern Ireland, an era known as the Troubles. It also
marked the beginning of a new phase of peacebuilding that continues to the present day.
Peacebuilding work was already taking place at the grassroots and civil-society levels
throughout the Troubles. It paved the way for the political peace process that led to the
Agreement and, eventually, the reestablishment of the Northern Ireland Assembly with a
power-sharing executive from both sides of the conflict.1 Peace in Northern Ireland during the
two decades since the Agreement, however, has been fragile; the Assembly was suspended five
times, the most recent lasting for three years, from 2017 to 2020. The fear of a return of violent
conflict remains high, with recent polls consistently finding that more than two-thirds of the
people in Northern Ireland live with this fear.2 Tension has increased since Brexit, with the
flaring up of riots over six nights in early April 2021, marking one of the worst episodes since
the Troubles.3
Northern Ireland remains a deeply divided society. The present-day peace has, to a large
degree, been sustained through the continuing sectarian segregation that occurs along
geographical, social, educational, and political divides.4 This segregation, however, is also one
of the causes of the fragility of this peace. A large part of the peacebuilding effort at the
grassroots and civil-society levels has focused on bridging these divides, while increasing
social capital through community and leadership development, especially in the interface
areas.5 At the institutional and governmental levels, significant action and change has not
matched the rhetoric during the years since the Agreement. Despite a succession of government
policies that aim to remove the barriers separating Protestant and Catholic communities, more
walls to peace have been built than brought down.6 More than 90 percent of public housing
remains segregated.7 The education system has also been slow to change; of the 1,136 schools
in Northern Ireland in 2021, still only a small fraction (65) are integrated.8
Some of this inertia, perhaps even a large part, may be attributed to factors within the
greater Northern Irish society and the difficulties that arise when individuals and communities
come together for collective action. John Lederach’s three-tier model for peacebuilding points
to the importance of grassroots movements and the engagement of the general population in
initiating the social change needed to galvanize political action.9 Jennifer Todd, who has
written extensively on Northern Ireland, suggests that such a social transformation involves
collective identity and would need to occur at the level of the “cultural substratum.”10 She does
not elaborate on what she means by “cultural substratum” or how this transformation might be
achieved. Since the 1980s, however, an appreciation for the role of cultural transformation in
the building of significant and sustained peace in Northern Ireland has persisted.11
While it remains uncertain how cultural change might be achieved, the cultural domain
has become the space for conflict.12 In their 1996 seminal study, “The Dynamics of Conflict in
Northern Ireland” Joseph Ruane and Jennifer Todd reflect:
Culture-identity, values, norms, ethos, world view, sense of place in history and in the
world—provides another arena for conflict in Northern Ireland. Conflict has centred on
ways in which cultural differences between communities have been inscribed in public
relations of hierarchy and control.13
The politicization and conflict over culture is exemplified by the deadlock around the Irish
Language Act, which has remained unresolved since it was presented in early 2017.14
How might cultural transformation be achieved in the middle of a cultural conflict where
all involved are more likely to pursue further entrenchment of their positions? If a sort of truce
or ceasefire is necessary to reclaim the cultural space for critical self-examination and dialogue,
how might it be attained? How can a common culture be fostered without diminishing
differences that are critical for security, in particular, group identity? In this and the following
2
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article, a “progress report” of ongoing work that began in 2015, I attempt to answer these
essential, though by no means definitive, questions. This report is based on a deep analysis and
appreciation of the complex, interacting psycho-social-cultural-political dimensions of
collective life. When this approach is applied to Northern Ireland, one can begin to appreciate
the impact of individual and collective trauma from three decades of violent conflict, against a
background of complex sectarian unrest spanning over three centuries. In this first article, I
consider some of background issues that inform this work. In the second, I outline a form of
collective work, which I call “cultural work,” to build sustainable peace.

Context and Caveats
When one considers situations from the point of view of a psychiatrist and psychoanalytic
psychotherapist, the “context” is paramount; it underpins everything. The personal and
professional contexts and the knowledge and experience that I bring to the construction of this
article are also relevant. Thus, I begin by discussing some of these contexts I used to help build
an understanding of my perspectives, as well as my biases, blind-spots, and prejudices.
When I consider the context of what I present or discuss, I keep in mind that there are
several contexts of the same issue or event. First, there is the subjectivity of a particular
individual and of all the individuals involved. The conceptual definition of subjectivity dictates
that there is no such thing as “shared subjectivity.” But we can have overlapping subjectivity
or intersubjectivity and consequently create the possibility for commonality. By and large,
subjectivity points to unique differences in perspectives. Second, there is the idea of a collective
context, a notion that makes certain assumptions about commonalities in characteristics,
history, experience, and culture that allow for the development of a shared context. This notion
does not dismiss the existence of unique differences but simply says, “For the moment, what
is shared is more important than that which is unique.” Third, there are multiple dimensions of
life that are in concurrent existence and each creates a particular context that bears influence
on an event or experience, whether that be economic, political, social, cultural, or spiritual.
One dimension might have a greater bearing on one situation than another. Fourth, the Western
notion of time, specifically, linear time, proposes a certain understanding of what is meant by
“historical context.” It often leads to the erroneous assumption that an event in the distant past
is less relevant than that which has occurred more recently. In the traumatized mind, this notion
of time might cease to exist and the distinction between the past and present is often blurred.
Thus, fifth, consideration needs to be given to the important context of the traumatized mind,
for the individual and the collective mind. I elaborate on this point later in my brief outline of
a psychology of trauma.
The complexities presented by my consideration of these contextual issues highlight
potential pitfalls and call for certain caveats. There is one more context, and with it, a major
caveat. In writing from the perspective of a psychoanalytic psychotherapist, I would ordinarily
explore the context of the inner world and its unconscious domain. Because arguments about
the validity and relevance of this dimension would distract from much of the work I present
here, I do not discuss it substantially. It is inescapable, however, that an awareness and
appreciation of the unconscious domain could inform this analysis and our understanding of
complex situations.

A Personal and Professional Context
One might rightly wonder how an ethnic Chinese, born and raised in the small town of Malacca,
Malaysia—which was colonized by the Portuguese, Dutch, British, and Japanese for more than
five centuries—and educated in England, who has been living in Australia for the past three
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decades, came to be interested in peacebuilding in Northern Ireland. My awareness of the
conflict stemmed from my time as a medical student in London, in the early 1980s.
I visited Belfast for the first time in 2008 for a conference where I met John, Lord
Alderdice, a colleague with a similar professional background of psychiatrist and
psychoanalytic psychotherapist. He was the Speaker of the reinstated Northern Ireland
Assembly after the Agreement. In 2013, as the founding director of CASSE (an organization
that helped schools and communities create safe and supportive environments through a
psychoanalytic understanding of bullying and violence), I invited him to visit Australia to assist
our work with Aboriginal communities. He became interested in my work with culture on
traumatized communities and invited me to give a talk on the topic in Belfast in 2015.
During that visit, I surveyed the art and cultural scene in Northern Ireland and wrote a
brief, reflective paper on its potential role in peacebuilding from a psychological perspective.15
The following year, as chair of the newly formed Centre for Democracy and Peacebuilding,
Lord Alderdice invited me to give a lecture at the Golden Thread Gallery on the theme “Art,
Trauma, and Cultural Change” and to present a workshop on the same theme at the Duncairn
Centre, attended by artists from across the sectarian divide. In 2018, I presented a lecture titled
“Cultural Work and Peacebuilding in Traumatised Communities” at Ulster University, and the
next year at the invitation of Byson Charities, I conducted a series of workshops on the same
topic for workers and leaders from communities and civil society. With the onset of the
pandemic, I continued to hold online discussions with a range of stakeholders as individuals
and groups. Among these was a project about cultural transformation on which I elaborate here.
The ideas presented in this article have emerged from a range of professional experiences.
Over the past two decades, I have worked with individuals and collectives to address their
traumatic experiences. For the greater part of that period, I was also the Director of the Dax
Centre; a unique organization that is dedicated to promoting mental health through art. It was
a role that included being the chief curator of the Cunningham Dax Collection, one of the
largest collections of art by people with experience of mental illness and trauma.16 Through the
process of accepting art by traumatized individuals and collectives, I had the opportunity to
learn not only about individual’s experiences but also about their respective communities. They
included rural communities affected by suicides, survivors of the Holocaust, survivors of
childhood sexual abuse, and those recovering from natural disasters, such as bush fires,
tsunamis, and earthquakes.17 It was, however, my work with the traumatized Aboriginal
communities in the desert of Central Australia, that helped me gain a deep and profound
understanding of the nature and significance of culture. The Aboriginal people I worked with
referred to their culture as “the cradle that holds us” as they spoke about their struggle for
survival in the face of colonization and dispossession: their crisis was not so much over
collective identity, as the continuity of their existence. A large part of what is being presented
here has its origin in that work with Aboriginal communities which spanned over eight years,
and it was with them that I conceived the concept of “cultural work.”18
That work highlighted the heightened sensitivities of traumatized collectives and led me
to formulate an understanding of the Aboriginal people’s psychology that has enabled me to
create a safe, cultural space for similarly traumatized communities in which to address cultural
issues. I elaborate onion of this approach will be covered in the second of these two articles. I
wish to emphasize, however, that the approach I take to this and other work, is less from the
position of an expert, but rather, from one who is “ignorant but interested,” especially in the
local context.
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A Brief History of the Conflict
I present the following brief outline of the history of the Northern Ireland conflict to assist the
reader who is unfamiliar, to highlight historical events that were, in my view, of major
psychological significance, and to declare the limitations of my understanding, especially in
regard to its complexities. I am a relative novice to the reading of Northern Irish history; its
writing reflects the conflict itself, affected by bias and revisionism. As I do not have the
expertise or scope to critically review the written history from all sides, my selective account
below invites criticism.
The Aboriginal people I worked with in the Australian desert told me that to understand
them, I needed to go back tens of thousands of years to the beginning of their history, the era
they call “Dreamtime,” for which they can claim a continuous oral history over more than a
thousand generations. In his study of ancient Irish history, J. P. Mallory acknowledges that he
appropriated the concept of dreamtime from the Indigenous Australian, for whom it was “a
sacred time in which both the natural world and human culture and traditions originated, and
these beginnings still resonate in the spiritual life of [their] people today.”19 He traces a written
account of the Irish Dreamtime to circa 1700 BC. Ireland, as a separate entity, as an island,
came into being around 11,000 BC. Before the rising sea level at the end of the Ice Age, a land
bridge connected Ireland to Britain, which in turn was connected to continental Europe.20
Mallory notes that the earliest evidence of human residents in Ireland dates to circa 8000 BC,
which corresponds to the time of the earliest colonization, most possibly from Scotland.21
Most histories of the conflict in Northern Ireland begin with 1171, when King Henry II
landed in Waterford, declaring himself the Lord of Ireland, and thus began the Anglo-Norman
invasion of Ireland, culminating in the Treaty of Windsor in 1175.22 Four centuries later, during
the reign of King James I and in the shadow of the Reformation, England extended its control.
The years 1609 through the1630s saw the organized mass settlement of Scottish and Northern
English Protestants on half a million acres of arable land in the province of Ulster, which at the
time was inhabited by Gaelic Catholics. This period, known as the Plantation, is widely
recognized as the beginning of the ethnic and sectarian conflict. By the end of the 1630s there
were as many as a hundred thousand Protestant settlers. In 1641, the Ulster Catholics staged a
rebellion that involved massacres of more than four thousand settlers. A.T.Q. Stewart believes
that event inflicted on Protestants a lasting fear of Catholics:
Here, if anywhere, the mentality of siege was born, as the warning bonfires blazed from
hilltop to hilltop, and the beating drums summoned men to the defence of castles and
walled towns crowded with refugees.23
R. F. Foster concurs:
What people thought happened in that bloody autumn conditioned events and attitudes
in Ireland for generations to come.24
For seven years after the rebellion, Ireland was self-governed by Catholics. In 1649,
however, Oliver Cromwell, on behalf of the English Parliament, crushed the alliance of
Catholics and Royalists, restoring the dominance of the Protestants. Strangely, little has been
written about how many Irish Catholics died during Cromwell’s campaign, though it is
generally agreed that many more perished from famine and plague in the following years.
Estimates range from 10 percent to more than 80 percent of the Irish population; if a median
of about 40 percent were considered, the number who died would have amounted to more than
six hundred thousand from a population of 1.5 million. If even the most conservative of these
estimates is true, the protracted devastation among Irish Catholics over the next forty years
would have bred a hatred that led to their support of the Catholic king James II in his attempt
to regain the throne from his Protestant daughter, Queen Mary II, and King William III. One
5
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of the first attacks was on the Protestant stronghold of Derry, which led to the Siege of Derry,
during which the settlers barricaded for 105 days from April to August 1689. This event
appears to have been etched into the psyche of Ulster Protestants and entrenched their siege
mentality. The siege was broken by the army of King William III, who subsequently defeated
James II at the Battle of Boyne in 1690.
The triumph of this battle, which has since been marked each year by Protestants on July
12, led to the imposition of the Protestant Ascendency, a set of government policies privileging
those of the Anglican Church over all others (including Presbyterians, then known as
Dissenters). The privileging of Anglicans remained a political, economic, and social reality for
more than two centuries. The policies were accompanied by the Penal Laws, which restricted
the practice of Catholicism and significantly disadvantaged Catholics economically, especially
with land ownership. By the time these laws were eased in the late eighteenth century, Catholics
made up 75 percent of the population, but they held only 5 percent of the land.25 In the south
and west of Ireland, Protestant landlords would lease small holdings to Catholics.
The nineteenth century saw a growing divide emerge between the north and south of
Ireland. By the early eighteenth century, with continuing migration from Scotland and northern
England, Protestants had become the majority in the north, while Gaelic Catholics constituted
the majority in the south. Ulster grew in wealth with industrialization and became one of the
leading producers of linen in the world. The south of Ireland, however, had become an
agricultural economy that was severely limited by inefficient small landholdings, a factor that
contributed to the Irish Potato Famine from 1845 to 1849.
Foster notes: “Where the Famine struck hardest, reflects fairly accurately the prevalence
of subsistence farming on tiny holdings: the west and south-west, upland parts of Tipperary,
Cavan. Death rate figures show that areas like East Leinster, and north and north-east Ulster
were not hard hit by comparison—Ulster least of all, with its diversified economy.”26 The
population of Ireland fell from more than eight million to less than six million (from the 1841
to the 1851 census); a recent re-evaluation suggests that one million may be attributed to the
famine and that the rest were emigrated.27 The exacerbation of suffering during the famine by
the British government’s failure to act and by its allowing food to be exported, leaving most of
the relief work to private initiatives while compensating only the landlords up to more than
three million pounds added to a deep resentment among Catholics toward the government and
drove the movement demanding devolution and Home Rule. These tensions led to the Easter
Rebellion of 1916 and independence in 1921.
Three overlapping, meta-narratives of psychological significance grew out of this
centuries-long history: (1) a story of hatred emerging from the colonization of Ireland and the
oppression of the Gaelic Catholics by the English for more than seven centuries marked by
rebellions raised and crushed and the suffering of the Great Famine that was perceived to be
inflicted by the colonizer; (2) the sectarian conflict between Catholics and Protestants,
characterized by a never-ending cycle of massacres—retaliation—vengeance—riots—and
more killings, which began in the Plantation era and continued for more than three centuries;
and (3) the geographical, economic, and ethnic divide between North and South of the island,
with the Protestants of Ulster holding a privileged position yet feeling insecure in their minority
and never quite recovering from the traumatic history of their early settlement.
This third narrative underpinned the partitioning of Ireland that created Northern Ireland.28
For the next one hundred years, while the Republic of Ireland flourished as a nation, the
tensions and legacies of the first and second narratives across the whole island appeared to
have been sequestrated into Northern Ireland, which erupted into the thirty-year conflict known
as the Troubles. These narratives and the events that marked them have been embedded in the
cultures of Catholics and Protestants, north of the island. These themes appear in folklore and
ballads and in these communities’ ways of being in the world and with each other.
6
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A Framework for Working with Culture
To undertake the work of cultural transformation for peacebuilding, we need to understand
how these historical events came to be embedded into their respective cultures. What was their
process?
Before I propose an answer to this question, I would like to outline a model of culture that
I developed in my work with traumatized collectives. I view culture as the mind of a collective.
If we were to think of the identifiable physical elements of a collective—its people, institutions,
networks, and so on—as the equivalent of the brain, then its culture would correspond to the
mind. It is well beyond the scope of this article to discuss the many different concepts and
definitions of culture, except to acknowledge the classic work by A. L. Kroeber and Clyde
Kluckhohn, which, from the perspective of anthropology, integrates 150 definitions and
proposes the following:
Culture consists of patterns, explicit or implicit, of and for behavior, acquired and
transmitted by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievements of human groups,
including their embodiments in artifacts.29
More recently, Baldwin and colleagues examined more than three hundred definitions,
highlighting recent contributions from cultural studies/critical theory, communication, and
social construct theory and proposed a shift in focus from patterns of human behavior/way of
life to processes that construct meaning, identity, and power dynamic.30
The concept of culture that I propose here incorporates both patterns and processes.
Popular discourse identifies music, art, food, fashion, literature, language, folklore, customs,
and rituals as culture. These are the most apparent elements of culture, which I refer to as
cultural products. Next, we have the creators and their processes for producing these cultural
products, which I refer to as cultural instruments. These instruments have two distinguishable
components: structures or entities and processes. Entities are the “who and what” that create
cultural products; they include individuals, organizations, and social institutions. If we are
thinking of art, music, and literature, the entities (as individuals or collectives) are the artists,
musicians, and writers, while their corresponding social institutions include all those that
support production and distribution, such as the media and social media and the marketplaces
that use and enjoy them. The other aspect of cultural instruments concerns the process of
production. Here we might consider not only the creative process but also broader, complex
influences of historical, social, economic, and political factors.
The model of culture I have outlined might be compared with what Pierre Bourdieu
describes from a sociological perspective. In his book The Field of Cultural Production,
Bourdieu considers art to be tangible, “symbolic goods” that are produced under the influence
of social reality at three levels: the field of power relations in society, the position of the agents
(creator/producer), and the producer’s habitus (i.e., the structured and structuring dispositions
that generate practices).31 From my understanding, what Bourdieu means by “habitus”
corresponds to what I call “cultural instruments.” Some might argue, however, that habitus
includes the values, norms, and the many nonspecific, difficult-to-describe ways that influence
our way of being in the world. I call these “cultural substrates.” Historical events, and more
important, how we experience and respond to them are all cultural substrates. I return to this
point later.
Many of my colleagues have found this framework consisting of cultural substrates,
instruments, and products to be accessible and useful. The model outlines how cultural
substrates are turned into products by their instruments, which consist of structures
(individuals, collectives, and institutions) and their respective processes. To illustrate how this
model might take shape in operation, we might consider how an event can lead to the creation
of an anthem.
7
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A musician might write a song about his or her experience of an event that occurred in the
life of a large collective. This private creation of a product involves the personal transformation
of a substrate (the experience of, and response to, an event) by an instrument (musician) into a
product (the song). The song could be considered a cultural product even if it were not shared
but remained in the private world of the musician. Once shared and enjoyed among friends,
that song might be considered a basic or simple form of a cultural product. If that song is
recorded and played multiple times on radio stations or streamed online, it acquires a greater
status as a cultural product. If that song resonates with a large proportion of the collective
within which that original event occurred, and especially those who were present at the time of
its occurrence, it acquires a special meaning as a cultural product. If that song resonated with
more and more people within that collective resonated with that song, including those who
were not present at the event and the generations following, it would acquire the status of an
anthem. Within this model, all those who were involved in distributing and promoting the song,
including those who enjoyed it, would be considered cultural instruments.32
These mechanisms can similarly be applied to the formation of folk culture and public
policies. Public policies, I believe, however elaborate or complex, begin with an individual and
his or her experience of events and the daily world; in this instance, the product is the idea that
arose from that experience. It remains a private idea until shared, further developed, and
promoted, until it reaches a level of acceptance within social power structures (public
institutions, governments) that gives it the status of a public policy. Some might suggest that
these later processes are usually intertwined with political processes. If so, it would bring into
relevance the role of values, ethos, and assumptions, as well as power dynamics and group
processes.
Some forms of cultural substrates are simple and some are complex. Values and ethos are
complex forms of cultural substrates, while the assumptions we make about ourselves, others,
and how the world works underpin what is important to us; assumptions are the simpler forms
of cultural substrates. The simplest forms of assumptions are sometimes referred to as basic
assumptions; they are assumptions that are not generally apparent33 and operate in the realm of
the unconscious.34 Another important feature of basic assumptions is that they are not derived
from reasoning, and the person who is proposing the idea or belief usually does not see the
need to provide a rationale—it is a “given.” In the context of the conflict in Northern Ireland,
a Protestant from Shankill Road in Belfast might be bewildered if asked why he thinks
Catholics should be feared and why they cannot be trusted; that Catholics are to be feared and
that they are untrustworthy are givens. A Catholic from the Falls Road might equally well
assume without question that Protestants are privileged and unforgiving. Even though most
would explain this attitude by their recent experiences, and others would argue that “everyone
in my community would agree” to support their position, few would understand the origins of
their basic assumptions. Furthermore, most would not see the need to search for an explanation,
for after all, these are givens.
In a discussion of the origins of these basic assumptions, A.T.Q Stewart notes that the fear
inspired by the 1641 massacre “survives in the Protestant subconscious as the memory of the
Penal Laws or the Famine persists in the Catholic.”35
The historical events in themselves are not sufficient to embed a lasting memory. The
response of those who survived and the response of the generations that follow contribute to
this process. There are also the complex issues of the historiography of traumatic events and
processes by which collective memories are made, both of which are highly relevant but well
beyond the scope of this article for further consideration.36 From a psychological perspective,
the shared experience of these events and their collective response create basic assumptions.
The experience of the initial terror of the massacres, the response by those present, the later
recounting of that experience, and the response to it by others and following generations
8
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created some of the most “basic” assumptions that underpin society in Northern Ireland. The
process of recording these first-hand experiences and their subsequent embellishment and
politicization would have transformed those early assumptions into more elaborate
assumptions tinged with emotion and prejudice. This is one of the ways historical events
become embedded in our shared consciousness, which, in essence, is our culture.

The Impact of Trauma
Historical events that were traumatizing for the majority of a collective might also be
transmitted across generations through what is known as transgenerational transmission of
trauma. This concept, which has become well established in the past forty years, was developed
through studies of Holocaust survivors and their children and grandchildren and confirmed by
studies of survivors from other atrocities and wars and the children of the veterans of these
wars.37 Transmission can occur through three mechanisms: (1) in a general sense, the traumatic
experience affects the mental health of the survivors, which then impacts their child-rearing
and family environment; (2) in a more specific way, the parents’ preoccupation with unresolved
issues relating to their traumatic experience becomes the predominant agenda for the whole
family—their children grow up without developing their own mind and adopt their parents’
preoccupation as their own; and (3) the final mechanism, called projective identification, is
unconscious. Projective identification occurs when survivors of a historical traumatic event are
unable to talk about it and might unconsciously collude among themselves to avoid the subject
altogether, for it is too painful to even think about. It is postulated that these memories are
disavowed and projected into their children, who carry them unconsciously in their mind and
pass the memories on to the next generation.
More than a century ago, Sigmund Freud proposed that when an experience and its
memory cannot be held in the conscious mind, it is either repressed into the unconscious
(therefore, forgotten) or disavowed and projected into the external world or into another person
(as in denial).38 He also proposed that individuals unconsciously recreate that experience, as if
to give themselves another chance at mastering that original encounter. This phenomenon is
known as “re-enactment,” which is to be distinguished from the conscious and deliberate acts
of memorialization that seek to remember and commemorate. Bearing in mind this distinction,
one might consider the events of the 12th of July among Protestants in Northern Ireland each
year as commemorations that involved processes of memorialization. When these rituals break
out into violent riots with Catholics, however, they might well be unconscious re-enactments
of traumatic events of the past three hundred years of conflicts.
If these riots have been the manifestations of deeply held, unprocessed, and unresolved
trauma from the three hundred years of conflict between Protestants and Catholics, the
necessary cultural transformation for lasting peace must reach a deep level. Some would
disagree with my suggestion that those in the present are unaware of the link between the recent
riots and the historical events. Earlier, I quoted several historians who have written about this
link. There are likely to be many more who have considered such a link in their understanding
of the causes of the conflict. Those who have worked with traumatized individuals would
undoubtedly have encountered many such people who, when asked, “What happened?” could
tell them. This knowledge by itself is often an intellectual fact isolated from personal emotional
significance. The process of therapy usually involves their asking three more questions. The
first two—“How did what happened affect me?” and “How do I feel about what happened to
me?”—constitute a process by which an emotional link is made with their traumatic
experience. Once they have understood the emotional impact of what until then was only an
intellectual fact, they can begin to make sense of what happened. This final stage usually
involves asking the fourth question, “Why did it happen?”
9
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I have found that this process, which consists of efforts to answer these four questions, is
applicable not only to individuals but also to collectives trying to find healing for their historical
trauma.39 These four questions have recently been used by a group of senior Japanese
academics and community leaders to frame their first interdisciplinary series of symposia,
addressing the long-term effects of their country’s traumatic experience and role in the Second
World War. One aim of these symposia is to encourage extensive conversations in Japanese
society about the war. For seventy-five years these conversations did not take place, in part to
avoid tension from possible conflict and in part because of a conspiracy of silence, a
phenomenon that often occurs in the aftermath of massive, collective trauma. The discussions
during these symposia among historians, sociologists, and mental health clinicians reached
some of the deepest, painful episodes of their history, stirring up feelings of guilt, shame, and
humiliation.40
A similar set of conversations about the traumatic experiences of Protestant and Catholic
communities from the past three hundred years would be necessary if these two groups were
to address their respective historical trauma and bring about a cultural transformation. There
is, however, an added layer of difficulty for Northern Ireland. The more recent trauma from the
Troubles has heightened the sensitivities of all involved and the risk of triggering encapsulated
trauma from the past is very high. I consider some of the issues relating to such pitfalls and
their consequences in an article titled, “The Impact of Trauma on Peace Processes” published
in an earlier issue of this journal.41
The results of an extensive survey of the trauma from the Troubles undertaken by the
Commission for Victims and Survivors were published in 2011.42 The study found “an
estimated 39% of the study population have experienced a conflict-related traumatic event”
and “an estimated 8.8% of the Northern Ireland adult population met the criteria for PTSD at
some point in their life while 5.1% met the criteria in the previous 12 months.” These figures
compare with a twelve-month prevalence rate for PTSD between 1 percent in Europe43 and 3–
4 percent in the United States.44 Significantly, but not surprisingly, conflict-related events were
also more prevalent among those aged 35–49 (46 percent) and 50–64 (44 percent).
These figures suggest that if in-depth conversations were to be held in these age groups
(which most community leaders fall into) about the traumatic history of Northern Ireland,
almost every second person would have experienced a significant conflict-related trauma.
Further consideration should be given to the dynamics of groups of which a large proportion
may have experienced significant trauma. Traumatized groups have unique dynamics with the
intragroup tendency to find scapegoats within, and an intergroup tendency to create enemies,
if there are not existing ones; these tendencies often operate simultaneously. When the group
is further stressed, which might occur when emotionally challenging memories are recalled or
tension develops between members, it regresses with predictable outcomes. This regression
begins with a propensity for binary thinking, which could deteriorate to unitary thinking where,
rather than two views (black and white), there is only a single perspective with no possibility
of an alternative view. This shift in the way people think is followed by a heightened
preoccupation with boundary (symbolic and geographic) and identity. Further regression leads
to splitting and fragmentation and, finally, an implosion characterized by intragroup conflict,
domestic violence, and suicide. I have observed these patterns of behavior among various
traumatized groups and communities in Northern Ireland. I understand they have presented a
challenge in cross-communal activities in interface neighborhoods. They would also contribute
to added difficulties in groups that were to come together to address their historical trauma and
cultural transformation.
In the next article, I discuss how some of these challenges might be overcome with a
trauma-informed approach to cultural transformation.
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Collective and Cultural Trauma
When we consider the traumatic history of Northern Ireland that has been passed down from
generation to generation for the past three hundred years or that was experienced in the thirty
years of the Troubles, we tend to think of the experience of individual minds. When we think
of traumatized groups, we tend to consider the individual members of the group. In the
preceding discussion of the behaviors of a regressed group, I have in mind the group as a whole;
that is, the psychology of the group as a single entity is more than the sum of its individual
members. Studies by proponents of collective psychology first appeared more than a hundred
years ago, with publications such as The Psychology of the Crowd by Gustave Le Bon in 1895
and The Group Mind by William McDougall in 1920. By the mid-twentieth century, these
conceptualizations have fallen out of favor and are now discussed dismissively as mob
psychology and herd mentality.
Recently, however, there has been a resurgence of interest in these ideas, which are
reflected in conceptualizations of what is known as “large group psychology” and “very large
group psychology,” with singular entities comprising hundreds and thousands. One of the
leading proponents of this psychology is Vamik Volkan, who has used it to address conflict
and violence at a societal level and within international relations and diplomacy.45 When one
is applying large-group psychology, the focus shifts from the individual members of the group
to the collective. This shift might be conceptualized as moving from the minds of individuals
to a singular consciousness, a collective mind. Since I use the term “collective mind”
throughout this article, I would like to summarize its key features because they are relevant to
the task of cultural transformation.
1. Collective psychology is pertinent to cultural transformation because both are
concerned with shared experiences and shared responses to those experiences. These
experiences are embedded in a shared consciousness. If we conceptualize this
phenomenon from a psychological perspective, we can understand it as a singular group
mind or collective mind. Or perhaps from a sociological perspective, we can view it as
a social network or simply, as I am proposing here, as culture. In my work with
collectives, this last concept tends to be most relevant and accessible to communities,
for they would speak of the culture of their communities.
2. If we were to think of shared, collective, or social consciousness interchangeably with
culture in the context of Northern Ireland, we find three domains of
consciousness/culture: the Protestant consciousness, the Catholic consciousness, and
their overlapping consciousness. I use the term “overlapping” rather than “shared” in
this context because I have observed, in many instances, a great reluctance to
acknowledge that which is common between them.
3. It might be assumed that each of these three prescribed consciousnesses has a
corresponding deep area that is not easily accessible, which might be called “the
unconscious.” I do not know whether the boundary between their respective
unconscious could be as clearly demarcated as their conscious domains. Donald
Winnicott has postulated that there is an area where the consciousness of the mother
and infant overlap, a zone he calls the “transitional space.”46 There is a growing
appreciation within psychology for a similar space in our close, personal encounters,
where there is an overlap of subjectivity, referred to as “intersubjectivity.” Is it possible
that the deeper we go into the respective “consciousness” of the Protestant and Catholic
communities, the more likely we are to find a space, perhaps a transitional space, where
there are common and shared elements and sufficient overlap for us to consider some
collective equivalence to intersubjectivity between individuals?
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4. While some of the cultural transformation that might be achieved within the Protestant
and Catholic communities would add to the peacebuilding effort, the creation of a truly
shared consciousness in the transitional space between them, with its own
intersubjectivity and culture, I believe, would lead to lasting peace. I discuss this point
further in the next article.
We have one more aspect of collective psychology to consider before we discuss how
cultural transformation can be achieved. In collective psychology, the equivalent of the concept
of transgenerational trauma discussed earlier is cultural trauma. In this situation, a collective
consciousness can be affected in such a deep and far-reaching way that the shared experience
becomes embedded in the culture and changes it significantly.
Over the past two decades, Jeffrey Alexander and his colleagues have been influential in
introducing the notion of cultural trauma, specifically, the way in which social mechanisms
within a collective come to consider certain shared experiences as traumatic and use them to
shape their identity.47 Their work has been instrumental in informing the contributions of
critical cultural theory, museology, and historiography for a range of public policy issues such
as nationalism, racism, slavery, and genocide. During the same period, Vamik Volkan has
highlighted the use of chosen trauma to encourage a form of nationalism that has often led to
violence and conflict.48
Alexander defines cultural trauma as follows:
When members of a collectivity feel they have been subjected to a horrendous event
that leaves indelible marks upon their group consciousness, marking their memories
forever and changing their future identity in fundamental and irrevocable ways.49
In my work with the desert Aboriginal people of Central Australia, I have witnessed a
different kind of cultural trauma. There, the traumatic experience is not a definable event but a
persistent and pervasive destruction of a way of being, through colonization and dispossession.
I call this “complex cultural trauma” and define it as occurring when the apparatus or system
through which a collective makes sense of its experience is corrupted, distorted, compromised,
or destroyed. I distinguish this kind of cultural trauma from that Alexander and his colleagues
identify in its relevance beyond collective identity, highlighting the damage to the holding
function of culture through the loss of a system of reference, which the Aboriginal people relied
on to make sense of their traumatic experience.50
If we apply these two kinds of cultural trauma to Northern Ireland, we can identify key
historical events that left indelible marks on the collective consciousness of the opposing
sectarian communities and thus changed their identity. Moreover, we could recognize a
distortion of their culture that is characterized by a predominant tendency to make sense of
experiences in terms of their relationship with their enemies. A striking outcome that bears
both kinds of cultural trauma is the refrain heard often among the youth in Northern Ireland: “I
don’t know who I am, but I know who I am not.” The cultural repertoire that they have inherited
either is rejected for its association with the conflict and violence of the Troubles or is no longer
useful in a post-conflict situation. What remains, however, is the basic (cultural) assumption
that the Other is either bad or to be feared.
Considering the cultural trauma discussed so far, it seems inadequate to propose any kind
of cultural transformation toward peacebuilding without also addressing the healing of shared
traumatic experiences. In the next article, I consider how these elements might be addressed
through what I call “cultural work.
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